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Large gaps in labor productivity between the traditional and modern parts of the economy are a fundamental
reality of developing societies.  In this paper, we document these gaps, and emphasize that labor flows
from low-productivity activities to high-productivity activities are a key driver of development. Our
results show that since 1990 structural change has been growth reducing in both Africa and Latin America,
with the most striking changes taking place in Latin America. The bulk of the difference between these
countries’ productivity performance and that of Asia is accounted for by differences in the pattern
of structural change – with labor moving from low- to high-productivity sectors in Asia, but in the
opposite direction in Latin America and Africa. In our empirical work, we identify three factors that
help determine whether (and the extent to which) structural change contributes to overall productivity
growth. In countries with a relatively large share of natural resources in exports, structural change
has typically been growth reducing. Even though these “enclave” sectors usually operate at very high
productivity, they cannot absorb the surplus labor from agriculture. By contrast, competitive or undervalued



















  One of the earliest and most central insights of the literature on economic development is 
that development entails structural change.  The countries that manage to pull out of poverty and 
get richer are those that are able to diversify away from agriculture and other traditional 
products.  As labor and other resources move from agriculture into modern economic activities, 
overall productivity rises and incomes expand.  The speed with which this structural 
transformation takes place is the key factor that differentiates successful countries from 
unsuccessful ones. 
  Developing economies are characterized by large productivity gaps between different 
parts of the economy.  Dual economy models à la W. Arthur Lewis have typically emphasized 
productivity differentials between broad sectors of the economy, such as the traditional (rural) 
and modern (urban) sectors.  More recent research has identified significant differentials within 
modern, manufacturing activities as well.  Large productivity gaps can exist even among firms 
and plants within the same industry.  Whether between plants or across sectors, these gaps tend 
to be much larger in developing countries than in advanced economies.  They are indicative of 
the allocative inefficiencies that reduce overall labor productivity.   
The upside of these allocative inefficiencies is that they can potentially be an important 
engine of growth.  When labor and other resources move from less productive to more 
productive activities, the economy grows even if there is no productivity growth within sectors.  
This kind of growth-enhancing structural change can be an important contributor to overall 
economic growth.  High-growth countries are typically those that have experienced substantial 
growth-enhancing structural change. As we shall see, the bulk of the difference between Asia’s   2
recent growth, on the one hand, and Latin America’s and Africa’s, on the other, can be explained 
by the variation in the contribution of structural change to overall labor productivity.  Indeed, 
one of the most striking findings of this paper is that in many Latin American and Sub-Saharan 
African countries, broad patterns of structural change have served to reduce rather than increase 
economic growth since 1990.    
 Developing  countries,  almost  without exception, have become more integrated with the 
world economy since the early 1990s.  Industrial tariffs are lower than they ever have been and 
foreign direct investment flows have reached new heights. Clearly, globalization has facilitated 
technology transfer and contributed to efficiencies in production.  Yet the very diverse outcomes 
we observe among developing countries suggest that the consequences of globalization depend 
on the manner in which countries integrate into the global economy. In several cases – most 
notably China, India, and some other Asian countries – globalization’s promise has been 
fulfilled.  High-productivity employment opportunities have expanded and structural change has 
contributed to overall growth. But in many other cases – in Latin America and Sub-Saharan 
Africa – globalization appears not to have fostered the desirable kind of structural change.  Labor 
has moved in the wrong direction, from more productive to less productive activities, including, 
most notably, informality.   
  This conclusion would seem to be at variance with a large body of empirical work on the 
productivity-enhancing effects of trade liberalization.  For example, study after study shows that 
intensified import competition has forced manufacturing industries in Latin America and 
elsewhere to become more efficient by rationalizing their operations.
1 Typically, the least 
productive firms have exited the industry, while remaining firms have shed “excess labor.”  It is 
                                                 
1 See for example Cavalcanti et al (2003), Esclava et al (2007), Fernandez et al (2007), McMillan et al (2004), Paus 
et al (2003) and Pavcnik (2002).   3
evident that the top tier of firms has closed the gap with the technology frontier – in Latin 
America and Africa, no less than in East Asia.  However, the question left unanswered by these 
studies is what happens to the workers who are thereby displaced.  In economies that don’t 
exhibit large inter-sectoral productivity gaps or high and persistent unemployment, labor 
displacement would not have important implications for economy-wide productivity.  In 
developing economies, on the other hand, the prospect that the displaced workers would end up 
in even lower-productivity activities (services, informality) cannot be ruled out.  That is indeed 
what seems to have typically happened in Latin America and Africa.  An important advantage of 
the broad, economy-wide approach we take in this paper is that it is able to capture changes in 
inter-sectoral allocative efficiency as well as improvements in within-industry productivity.   
  In our empirical work, we identify three factors that help determine whether (and the 
extent to which) structural change goes in the right direction and contributes to overall 
productivity growth.  First, economies with a revealed comparative advantage in primary 
products are at a disadvantage.  The larger the share of natural resources in exports, the smaller 
the scope of productivity-enhancing structural change.  The key here is that minerals and natural 
resources do not generate much employment, unlike manufacturing industries and related 
services. Even though these “enclave” sectors typically operate at very high productivity, they 
cannot absorb the surplus labor from agriculture.   
  Second, we find that countries that maintain competitive or undervalued currencies tend 
to experience more growth-enhancing structural change.  This is in line with other work that 
documents the positive effects of undervaluation on modern, tradable industries (Rodrik 2008).    
Undervaluation acts as a subsidy on those industries and facilitates their expansion.     4
  Finally, we also find evidence that countries with more flexible labor markets experience 
greater growth-enhancing structural change.  This also stands to reason, as rapid structural 
change is facilitated when labor can flow easily across firms and sectors.  By contrast, we do not 
find that other institutional indicators, such as measures of corruption or the rule of law, play a 
significant role.        
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes our data and 
presents some stylized facts on economy-wide gaps in labor productivity.  The core of our 
analysis is contained in section III, where we discuss patterns of structural change in Africa, Asia 
and Latin America since 1990.  Section IV focuses on explaining why structural change has been 
growth-enhancing in some countries and growth-reducing in others. Section V offers final 
comments.  The Appendix provides further details about the construction of our data base. 
 
II. The data and some stylized facts 
  Our data base consists of sectoral and aggregate labor productivity statistics for 38 
countries, covering the period up to 2005.  Of the countries included, twenty-nine are developing 
countries and nine are high-income countries.  The countries and their geographical distribution 
are shown in Table 1, along with some summary statistics.   
In constructing our data, we took as our starting point the Groningen Growth and 
Development Center (GGDC) data base, which provides employment and real valued added 
statistics for 27 countries disaggregated into 10 sectors (Timmer and de Vries, 2007; 2009).
2  
The GGDC dataset does not include any African countries or China.  Therefore, we collected our 
                                                 
2 The original GGDC sample also includes West Germany, but we dropped it from our sample due to the truncation 
of the data after 1991. The latest update available for each country was used. Data for Latin American and Asian 
countries came from the June 2007 update, while data for the European countries and the U.S. came from the 
October 2008 update.   5
own data from national sources for an additional eleven countries, expanding the sample to cover 
several African countries, China and Turkey (another country missing from the GGDC sample). 
In order to maintain consistency with the GGDC Database data, we followed, as closely as 
possible, the procedures on data compilation followed by the GGDC authors.
3 For purposes of 
comparability, we combined two of the original sectors (Government Services and Community, 
Social and Personal Services) into a single one, reducing the total number of sectors to nine.  We 
converted local currency value added at 2000 prices to dollars using 2000 PPP exchange rates.  
Labor productivity was computed by dividing each sector’s value added by the corresponding 
level of sectoral employment.  We provide more details on our data construction procedures in 
the Appendix.  The sectoral breakdown we shall use in the rest of the paper is shown in Table 2. 
A big question with data of this sort is how well they account for the informal sector.  
Our data for value added come from national accounts, and as mentioned by Timmer and de 
Vries (2007), the coverage of such data varies from country to country.  While all countries make 
an effort to track the informal sector, obviously the quality of the data can vary greatly.  On 
employment, Timmer and de Vries’ strategy is to rely on household surveys (namely, population 
censuses) for total employment levels and their sectoral distribution, and use labor force surveys 
for the growth in employment between census years. Census data and other household surveys 
tend to have more complete coverage of informal employment.  In short, a rough characterization 
would be that the employment numbers in our dataset broadly coincide with actual employment 
levels regardless of formality status, while the extent to which value added data include or 
exclude the informal sector heavily depends on the quality of national sources. 
                                                 
3 For a detailed explanation of the protocols followed to compile the GGDC 10-Sector Database, the reader is 
referred to the “Sources and Methods” section of the database’s web page: 
http://www.ggdc.net/databases/10_sector.htm.   6
The countries in our sample range from Malawi, with an average labor productivity of 
$1,354 (at 2000 PPP dollars), to the United States, where labor productivity is more than fifty 
times as large ($70,235).  They include nine African countries, nine Latin American countries, 
ten developing Asian countries, one Middle Eastern country, and nine high-income countries. 
China is the country with the fastest overall productivity growth rate (8.9 percent per annum 
between 1990 and 2005).  At the other extreme, Kenya, Zambia, Malawi, and Venezuela have 
experienced negative productivity growth rates over the same period.     
As Table 1 shows, labor productivity gaps between different sectors are typically very 
large in developing countries.  This is particularly true for poor countries with mining enclaves, 
where few people tend to be employed at very high labor productivity.  In Malawi, for example, 
labor productivity in mining is 136 times larger than that in agriculture!  In fact, if only all of 
Malawi’s workers could be employed in mining, Malawi’s labor productivity would match that 
of the United States.  Of course, mining cannot absorb many workers, and neither would it make 
sense to invest in so much physical capital across the entire economy.       
 It may be more meaningful to compare productivity levels across sectors with similar 
potential to absorb labor, and here too the gaps can be quite large.  We see a typical pattern in 
Turkey, which is a middle-income country with still a large agricultural sector (Figure 1).  
Productivity in construction is more than twice the productivity in agriculture, and productivity 
in manufactures is almost three times as large.  The average manufactures-agriculture 
productivity ratio is 2.3 in Africa, 2.8 in Latin America, and 3.9 in Asia.  Note that the 
productivity-disadvantage of agriculture does not seem to be largest in the poorest countries, a 
point to which we will return below.   7
On the whole, however, inter-sectoral productivity gaps are clearly a feature of 
underdevelopment.  They are widest for the poorest countries in our sample and tend to diminish 
as a result of sustained economic growth.  Figure 2 shows how a measure of economy-wide 
productivity gaps, the coefficient of variation of the log of sectoral labor productivities, declines 
over the course of development. The relationship between this measure and the average labor 
productivity in the country is negative and highly statistically significant.  The figure underscores 
the important role that structural change plays in producing convergence, both within economies 
and across poor and rich countries.  The movement of labor from low-productivity to high-
productivity activities raises economy-wide labor productivity.  Under diminishing marginal 
products, it also brings about convergence in economy-wide labor productivities.   
The productivity gaps described here refer to differences in average labor productivity.  
When markets work well and structural constraints don’t bind, it is productivities at the margin 
that should be equalized.  Under a Cobb-Douglas production function specification, the marginal 
productivity of labor is the average productivity multiplied by the labor share.  So if labor shares 
differ greatly across economic activities comparing average labor productivities can be 
misleading.  The fact that average productivity in public utilities is so high (see Table 2), for 
example, may simply indicate that the labor share of value added in this capital-intensive sector 
is quite small.  But in the case of other sectors it is not clear that there is a significant bias.  Once 
the share of land is taken into account, for example, it is not obvious that the labor share in 
agriculture is significantly lower than in manufacturing (Mundlak et al., 2008).  So the 2-4-fold 
differences in average labor productivities between manufacturing and agriculture do point to 
large gaps in marginal productivity.    8
  Another way to emphasize the contribution of structural change is to document how 
much of the income gap between rich and poor countries is accounted for by differences in 
economic structure as opposed to differences in productivity levels within sectors.  Since even 
poor economies have some industries that operate at high level of productivity, it is evident that 
these economies would get a huge boost if such industries could employ a much larger share of 
the economy’s labor force.  The same logic applies to broad patterns of structural change as well, 
captured by our 9-sector classification.   
  Consider the following thought experiment.  Suppose that sectoral productivity levels in 
the poor countries were to remain unchanged, but that the inter-sectoral distribution of 
employment matched what we observe in the advanced economies.
4  This would mean that 
developing countries would employ a lot fewer workers in agriculture and a lot more in their 
modern, productive sectors.  We assume that these changes in employment patterns could be 
achieved without any change (up or down) in productivity levels within individual sectors.  What 
would be the consequences for economy-wide labor productivity?  Figures 3 and 4 show the 
results for the non-African and African samples, respectively. 
  The hypothetical gains in overall productivity from sectoral reallocation, along the lines 
just described, are quite large, especially for the poorer countries in the sample.  India’s average 
productivity would more than double, while China’s would almost triple (Figure 3).  The 
potential gains are particularly large for several African countries, which is why those countries 
are shown on a separate graph using a different scale.  Ethiopia’s productivity would increase 
six-fold, Malawi’s seven-fold, and Senegal’s eleven-fold!  Of course these numbers are only 
indicative of the extent of dualism that marks poor economies and should not be taken literally.  
                                                 
4 The inter-sectoral distribution of employment for high-income countries is calculated as the simple average of each 
sector’s employment share across the high-income sample. 
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Taking developing countries as a whole, as much as a fifth of the productivity gap that separates 
them from the advanced countries would be eliminated by the kind of reallocation considered 
here.   
 Traditional  dual-economy  models  emphasize the productivity gaps between the 
agricultural (rural) and non-agricultural (urban) parts of the economy.  Indeed, the summary 
statistics in Table 1 show that agriculture is typically the lowest-productivity activity in the 
poorest economies.  Yet another interesting stylized fact of the development process revealed by 
our data is that the productivity gap between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors 
behaves non-monotonically during economic growth.  The gap first increases and then falls, so 
that the ratio of agricultural to non-agricultural productivity exhibits a U-shaped pattern as the 
economy develops.   
This is shown in Figure 5, where the productivity ratio between agriculture and non-
agriculture (i.e., the rest of the economy) is graphed against the (log) of average labor 
productivity for our full panel of observations.  A quadratic curve fits the data very well, and 
both terms of the equation are statistically highly significant.  The fitted quadratic indicates that 
the turning point comes at an economy-wide productivity level of around $9,000 ( = exp(9.1)) 
per worker. This corresponds to a development level somewhere between that of India and China 
in 2005.   
We can observe this U-shaped relationship also over time within countries, as is shown in 
Figure 6 which collates the time-series observations for three countries at different stages of 
development (India, Peru, and France).  India, which is the poorest of the three countries, is on 
the downward sloping part of the curve.  As its economy has grown, the gap between agricultural 
and non-agricultural productivity has increased (and the ratio of agricultural to non-agricultural   10
productivity has fallen).  France, a wealthy country, has seen the opposite pattern.  As income 
has grown, there has been greater convergence in the productivity levels of the two types of 
sectors.  Finally, Peru represents an intermediate case, having spent most of its recent history 
around the minimum-point at the bottom of the U-curve.  
  A basic economic logic lies behind the U-curve. A very poor country has few modern 
industries in the non-agricultural parts of the economy.  So even though agricultural productivity 
is very low, there isn’t a large gap yet with the rest of the economy.  Economic growth typically 
happens with investments in the modern, urban parts of the economy.  As these sectors expand, a 
wider gap begins to open between the traditional and modern sectors. The economy becomes 
more “dual.”
5 At the same time, labor begins to move from traditional agriculture to the modern 
parts of the economy, and this acts as a countervailing force. Past a certain point, this second 
force becomes the dominant one, and productivity levels begin to converge within the economy.  
This story highlights the two key dynamics in the process of structural transformation: the rise of 
new industries (i.e., economic diversification) and the movement of resources from traditional 
industries to these newer ones.   Without the first, there is little that propels the economy 
forward. Without the second, productivity gains don’t diffuse in the rest of the economy.  
  We end this section by relating our stylized facts to some other recent strands of the 
development literature that have focused on productivity gaps and misallocation of resources.  
There is a growing literature on productive heterogeneity within industries.  Most industries in 
the developing world are a collection of smaller, typically informal firms that operate at low 
levels of productivity along with larger, highly productive firms that are better organized and use 
more advanced technologies.  Various studies by the McKinsey Global Institute have 
                                                 
5 See Kuznets (1955) for an argument along these lines.  However, Kuznets conjectured that the gap between 
agriculture and industry would keep increasing, rather than close down as we see here.   11
documented in detail the duality within industries.  For example, MGI’s analysis of a number of 
Turkish industries finds that on average the modern segment of firms is almost three times as 
productive as the traditional segment (MGI 2003).  Bartelsman et al. (2006) and Hsieh and 
Klenow (2009) have focused on the dispersion in total factor productivity across plants, the 
former for a range of advanced and semi-industrial economies and the latter for China and India. 
Hsieh and Klenow’s (2009) findings indicate that between a third and a half of the gap in these 
countries’ manufacturing TFP vis-à-vis the U.S. would be closed if the “excess” dispersion in 
plant productivity were removed. There is also a substantial empirical literature, mentioned in 
the introduction, which underscores the allocative benefits of trade liberalization within 
manufacturing: as manufacturing firms are exposed to import competition, the least productive 
among them lose market share or shut down, raising the average productivity of those that 
remain.   
  There is an obvious parallel between these studies and ours. Our data are too broad-brush 
to capture the finer details of misallocation within individual sectors and across plants and firms. 
But a compensating factor is that we may be able to track the economy-wide effects of re-
allocation – something that analyses that remain limited to manufacturing cannot do.  
Improvements in manufacturing productivity that come at the expense of greater inter-sectoral 
misallocation – say because employment shifts from manufacturing to informality – need not be 
a good bargain.  In addition, we are able to make comparisons among a larger sample of 
developing countries. So this paper should be viewed as a complement to the plant- or firm-level 
studies. 
    12
III. Patterns of structural change and productivity growth 
We now describe the pace and nature of structural change in developing economies over 
the period 1990 to 2005. We focus on this period for two reasons. First, this is the most recent 
period, and one where globalization has exerted a significant impact on all developing nations.  It 
will be interesting to see how different countries have handled the stresses and opportunities of 
advanced globalization.  And second, this is the period for which we have the largest sample of 
developing countries.  
We will demonstrate that there are large differences in patterns of structural change 
across countries and regions and that these account for the bulk of the differential performance 
between successful and unsuccessful countries.  In particular, while Asian countries have tended 
to experience productivity-enhancing structural change, both Latin America and Africa have 
experienced productivity-reducing structural change. In the next section we will turn to an 
analysis of the determinants of structural change. In particular, we are interested in 
understanding why some countries have the right kind of structural change while others have the 
wrong kind.   
    
A.  Defining the contribution of structural change 
  Labor productivity growth in an economy can be achieved in one of two ways.  First, 
productivity can grow within economic sectors through capital accumulation, technological 
change, or reduction of misallocation across plants.  Second, labor can move across sectors, from 
low-productivity sectors to high-productivity sectors, increasing overall labor productivity in the 
economy.  This can be expressed using the following decomposition:    
   13
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where  t Y  and  t i y ,  refer to economy-wide and sectoral labor productivity levels, respectively, 
and  t i,   is the share of employment in sector i. The Δ operator denotes the change in productivity 
or employment shares between t-k and t.  The first term in the decomposition is the weighted 
sum of productivity growth within individual sectors, where the weights are the employment 
share of each sector at the beginning of the time period.  We will call this the “within” 
component of productivity growth.  The second term captures the productivity effect of labor re-
allocations across different sectors.  It is essentially the inner product of productivity levels (at 
the end of the time period) with the change in employment shares across sectors.  We will call 
this second term the “structural change” term. When changes in employment shares are 
positively correlated with productivity levels, this term will be positive, and structural change 
will increase economy-wide productivity growth.   
  The decomposition above clarifies how partial analyses of productivity performance 
within individual sectors (e.g., manufacturing) can be misleading when there are large 
differences in labor productivities ( t i y , ) across economic activities.  In particular, a high rate of 
productivity growth within an industry can have quite ambiguous implications for overall 
economic performance if the industry’s share of employment shrinks rather than expands.  If the 
displaced labor ends up in activities with lower productivity, economy-wide growth will suffer 
and may even turn negative. 
 
B.  Structural change in Latin America: 1950-2005 
   14
  Before we present our own results, we illustrate this possibility with a recent finding on 
Latin America.  When the Inter-American Development Bank recently analyzed the pattern of 
productivity change in the region since 1950, using the same Timmer and de Vries (2007, 2009) 
dataset and a very similar decomposition, it uncovered a striking result, shown in Figure 7.  
Between 1950 and 1975, Latin America experienced rapid (labor) productivity growth of almost 
4 percent per annum, roughly half of which was accounted for by structural change.  Then the 
region went into a debt crisis and experienced a “lost decade,” with productivity growth in the 
negative territory between 1975 and 1990.  Latin America returned to growth after 1990, but 
productivity growth never regained the levels seen before 1975.  This is due entirely to the fact 
that the contribution of structural change has now turned negative.  The “within” component of 
productivity growth is virtually identical in the two periods 1950-1975 and 1990-2005 (at 1.8 
percent per annum).  But the structural change component went from 2 percent during 1950-
1975 to -0.2 percent in 1990-2005, an astounding reversal in the course of a few decades.             
  This is all the more surprising in light of the commonly accepted view that Latin 
America’s policies and institutions improved significantly as a result of the reforms of the late 
1980s and early 1990s.  Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, and most of the other 
economies got rid of high inflation, brought fiscal deficits under control, turned over monetary 
policy to independent central banks, eliminated financial repression, opened up their economies 
to international trade and capital flows, privatized state enterprises, reduced red tape and most 
subsidies, and gave markets freer rein in general.  Those countries which had become 
dictatorships during the 1970s experienced democratic transitions, while others significantly 
improved governance as well.  Compared to the macroeconomic populism and protectionist,   15
import-substitution policies that had prevailed until the end of the 1970s, this new economic 
environment was expected to yield significantly enhanced productivity performance. 
  The sheer scale of the contribution of structural change to this reversal of fortune has 
been masked by microeconomic studies that record significant productivity gains for individual 
plants or industries, and further, find these gains to be strongly related to post-1990 policy 
reforms.  In particular, studies after studies have shown that the intensified competition brought 
about by trade liberalization has forced manufacturing industries to become more productive (see 
for example Pavcnik 2000, Paus et al. 2003, Cavalcanti Ferreira and Rossi 2003, Fernandes 
2007, and Esclava et al. 2009).  A key mechanism that these studies document is what’s called 
“industry rationalization:” the least productive firms exit the industry, and remaining firms shed 
“excess labor.”   
The question left unanswered is what happens to the workers who are thereby displaced.  
In economies which do not exhibit large inter-sectoral productivity gaps, labor displacement 
would not have important implications for economy-wide productivity.  Clearly, this is not the 
case in Latin America.  The evidence in Figure 7 suggests instead that displaced workers may 
have ended up in less productive activities.  In other words, rationalization of manufacturing 
industries may have come at the expense of inducing growth-reducing structural change. 
An additional point that needs making is that these calculations (as well as the ones we 
report below) do not account for unemployment.  For a worker, unemployment is the least 
productive status of all.  In most Latin American countries unemployment has trended upwards 
since the early 1990s, rising by several percentage points of the labor force in Argentina, Brazil, 
and Colombia.  Were we to include the displacement of workers into unemployment, the   16
magnitude of the productivity-reducing structural change experienced by the region would look 
even more striking.
6   
  Figure 7 provides interesting new insight on what has held Latin American productivity 
growth back in recent years, despite apparent technological progress in many of the advanced 
sectors of the region’s economies.  But it also raises a number of questions.  In particular, was 
this experience a general one across all developing countries, and what explains it?  If there are 
significant differences across countries in this respect, what are the drivers of these differences?   
 
C.  Patterns of structural change by region 
We present our central findings on patterns of structural change in Figure 8.  Simple 
averages are presented for the 1990-2005 period for four groups of countries: Latin America, 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and high-income countries.
7   
We note first that structural change has made very little contribution (positive or 
negative) to the overall growth in labor productivity in the high-income countries in our sample.  
This is as expected, since we have already noted the disappearance of inter-sectoral productivity 
gaps during the course of development.  Even though many of these advanced economies have 
experienced significant structural change during this period, with labor moving predominantly 
from manufacturing to service industries, this (on its own) has made little difference to 
productivity overall.  What determines economy-wide performance in these economies is, by and 
large, how productivity fares in each individual sector. 
                                                 
6 We have undertaken some calculations along these lines, including “unemployment” as an additional sector in the 
decomposition.  Preliminary calculations indicate that the rise in unemployment between 1990 and 2005 worsens the 
structural change term by an additional 0.2 percentage points. We hope to report results on this in future work. 
7 Even though Turkey is in our dataset, this country has not been included in this and the next figure because it is the 
only Middle Eastern country in our sample.   17
The developing countries exhibit a very different picture.  Structural change has played 
an important role in all three regions.  But most striking of all is the differences among the 
regions.  In both Latin America and Africa, structural change has made a sizable negative 
contribution to overall growth, while Asia is the only region where the contribution of structural 
change is positive.  (The results for Latin America do not match exactly those in Figure 7 
because we have applied a somewhat different methodology when computing the decomposition 
from that used by Pages et al., 2010.
8)  We note again that these computations do not take into 
account unemployment.  Latin America (certainly) and Africa (possibly) would look 
considerably worse if we accounted for the rise of unemployment in these regions.    
Hence, the curious pattern of growth-reducing structural change that we observed above 
for Latin America is repeated in the case of Africa.  This only deepens the puzzle as Africa is 
substantially poorer than Latin America.  If there is one region where we would have expected 
the flow of labor from traditional to modern parts of the economy to be an important driver of 
growth, a la dual-economy models, that surely is Africa.  The disappointment is all the greater in 
light of all of the reforms that African countries have undergone since the late 1980s. Yet labor 
seems to have moved from high- to low- productivity activities on average, reducing Africa’s 
growth by 1.3 percentage points per annum on average (Table 3).  Since Asia has experienced 
growth-enhancing structural change during the same period, it is difficult to ascribe Africa’s and 
Latin America’s performance solely to globalization or other external determinants.  Clearly, 
country-specific forces have been at work as well.                  
Differential patterns of structural change in fact account for the bulk of the difference in 
regional growth rates.  This can be seen by checking the respective contributions of the “within” 
                                                 
8 We fixed some data discrepancies and used a 9-sector disaggregation to compute the decomposition rather than 
IDB’s 3-sector disaggregation.  See the data appendix for more details.  
   18
and “structural change” components to the differences in productivity growth in the three 
regions.  Asia’s labor productivity growth in 1990-2005 exceeded Africa’s by 3 percentage 
points per annum and Latin America’s by 2.5 percentage points.  Of this difference, the structural 
change term accounts for 1.84 points (61%) in Africa and 1.45 points (58%) in Latin America.  
We saw above that the decline in the contribution of structural change was a key factor behind 
the deterioration of Latin American productivity growth since the 1960s.  We now see that the 
same factor accounts for the lion’s share of Latin America’s (as well as Africa’s) under-
performance relative to Asia.     
In other words, where Asia has outshone the other two regions is not so much in 
productivity growth within individual sectors, where performance has been broadly similar, but 
in ensuring that the broad pattern of structural change contributes to, rather than detracts from, 
overall economic growth.  As Table 4 shows, some mineral-exporting African countries such as 
Zambia and Nigeria have in fact experienced very high productivity growth at the level of 
individual sectors, as have many Latin American countries.  But when individual countries are 
ranked by the magnitude of the structural change term, it is Asian countries that dominate the top 
of the list.             
The regional averages we have discussed so far are unweighted averages across countries 
that do not take into account differences in country size.  When we compute a regional average 
that sums up value added and employment in the same sector across countries, giving more 
weight to larger countries, we obtain the results shown in Figure 9.  The main difference now is 
that we get a much larger “within” component for Asia, an artifact of the predominance of China 
in the weighted sample.  Also, the negative structural change component turns very slightly 
positive in Latin America, indicating that labor flows in the larger Latin American countries   19
haven’t gone as much in the wrong direction as they have in the smaller ones.  Africa still has a 
large and negative structural change term. Asia once more greatly outdoes the other two 
developing regions in terms of the contribution of structural change to overall growth. 
 
D.  More details on individual countries and sectors 
The presence of growth-reducing structural change on such a scale is a surprising 
phenomenon that calls for further scrutiny.  We can gain further insight into our results by 
looking at the sectoral details for specific countries.  We note that growth-reducing structural 
change indicates that the direction of labor flows is negatively correlated with (end-of-period) 
labor productivity in individual sectors.  So for selected countries we plot the (end-of-period) 
relative productivity of sectors ( t t i Y y / , ) against the change in their employment share ( t i,   ) 
between 1990 and 2005.  The relative size of each sector (measured by employment) is indicated 
by the circles around each sector’s label in the scatter plots. The next six figures (Figures 10-15) 
show sectoral detail for two countries each from Latin America, Africa, and Asia.     
  Argentina shows a particularly clear-cut case of growth-reducing structural change 
(Figure 10).  The sector with the largest relative loss in employment is manufacturing, which 
also happens to be the largest sector among those with above-average productivity.  Most of this 
reduction in manufacturing employment took place during the 1990s, under the Argentine 
experiment with hyper-openness.  Even though the decline in manufacturing was halted and 
partially reversed during the recovery from the financial crisis of 2001-2002, this was not enough 
to change the overall picture for the period 1990-2005.  By contrast, the sector experiencing the 
largest employment gain is community, personal, and government services, which has a high   20
level of informality and is among the least productive.  Hence the sharply negative slope of the 
Argentine scatter plot.   
  Brazil shows a somewhat more mixed picture (Figure 11).  The collapse in manufacturing 
employment was not as drastic as in Argentina (relatively speaking), and it was somewhat 
counterbalanced by the even larger contraction in agriculture, a significantly below-average 
productivity sector.  On the other hand, the most rapidly expanding sectors were again relatively 
unproductive non-tradable sectors such as personal and community services and wholesale and 
retail trade.  On balance, the Brazilian slope is slightly negative, indicating a small growth-
reducing role for structural change.        
  The African cases of Nigeria and Zambia show negative structural change for somewhat 
different reasons (Figures 12 and 13).  In both countries, the employment share of agriculture has 
increased significantly (alongside with community and government services in Nigeria).  By 
contrast, manufacturing and relatively productive tradable services have experienced a 
contraction – a remarkable anomaly for countries at such low levels of development, in which 
these sectors are quite small to begin with. The expansion of agricultural employment in Zambia 
is particularly large – more than 20 percentage points of total employment between 1990 and 
2005, if the numbers are to be believed.  These figures indicate a veritable exodus from the rest 
of the economy back to agriculture, where labor productivity is roughly half of what it is 
elsewhere.  Thurlow and Wobst (2005, pp. 24-25) describe how the decline of formal 
employment in Zambian manufacturing during the 1990s as a result of import liberalization led 
to many low-skilled workers ending up in agriculture. 
  Africa exhibits a lot of heterogeneity, however, and the expansion of agricultural 
employment that we see in Nigeria and Zambia is not a common phenomenon across the   21
continent.  In general the sector with the largest relative loss in employment is wholesale and 
retail trade where productivity is higher (in Africa) than the economy-wide average. The 
expansion of employment in manufacturing has been meager, at around one quarter of one 
percent over the fifteen year period. The sector experiencing the largest employment gain tends 
to be community, personal, and government services, which has a high level of informality and is 
the least productive.   
Ghana, Ethiopia and Malawi are three countries that have experienced growth-enhancing 
structural change.  In all three cases, the share of employment in the agricultural sector has 
declined while the share of employment in the manufacturing sector has increased. However, 
labor productivity in manufacturing remains notably low in both Ghana and Ethiopia.  
  Compare the African cases now to India, which has experienced significant growth-
enhancing structural change since 1990.  As Figure 15 shows, labor has moved predominantly 
from very low-productivity agriculture to modern sectors of the economy, including notably 
manufacturing.  India is one of the poorest countries in our sample, so its experience need not be 
representative.  But another Asian country, Thailand, shows very much the same pattern (Figure 
16).  In fact, the magnitude of growth-enhancing structural change in Thailand has been 
phenomenal, with agriculture’s employment share declining by some 20 percentage points and 
manufacturing experiencing significant gains.           
  Not all Asian countries exhibit this kind of pattern.  South Korea and Singapore, in 
particular, look more like Latin American countries in that high-productivity manufacturing 
sectors have shrunk in favor of some relatively lower-productivity service activities.  But in both 
of these cases, very rapid “within” productivity growth has more than offset the negative 
contribution from structural change.  That has not happened in Latin America. Moreover, a   22
contraction in the share of the labor force in manufacturing is not always a bad thing. For 
example, in the case of Hong Kong, the share of the labor force in manufacturing fell by more 
than 20%. But because productivity in manufacturing is lower than productivity in most other 
sectors, this shift has produced growth-enhancing structural change.  
 
IV.  What explains these patterns of structural change? 
  All developing countries in our sample have become more “globalized” during the time 
period under consideration.  They have phased out remaining quantitative restrictions on imports, 
slashed tariffs, encouraged direct foreign investment and exports, and, in many cases, opened up 
to cross-border financial flows.  So it is natural to think that globalization has played an 
important behind-the-scenes role in driving the patterns of structural change we have 
documented above. 
  However, it is also clear that this role cannot have been a direct, straightforward one.  For 
one thing, what stands out in the findings described previously is the wide range of outcomes: 
some countries (mostly in Asia) have continued to experience rapid, productivity-enhancing 
structural change, while others (mainly in Africa and Latin America) have begun to experience 
productivity-reducing structural change.  A common external environment cannot explain such 
large differences.  Second, as important as agriculture, mining, and manufacturing are, a large 
part – perhaps a majority – of jobs are still provided by non-tradable service industries.  So 
whatever contribution globalization has made, it must depend heavily on local circumstances, 
choices made by domestic policy makers, and domestic growth strategies.   
  We have noted above the costs that premature de-industrialization have on economy-
wide productivity.  Import competition has caused many industries to contract and release labor   23
to less productive activities, such as agriculture and informality.  One important difference 
among countries may be the degree to which they are able to manage such downsides.  A notable 
feature of Asian-style globalization is that it has had a two-track nature: many import-competing 
activities have continued to receive support while new, export-oriented activities were spawned.  
For example, until the mid-1990s, China had liberalized its trade regime at the margin only.  
Firms in special economic zones (SEZs) operated under free-trade rules, while domestic firms 
still operated behind high trade barriers.  State enterprises still continue to receive substantial 
support.  In an earlier period, South Korea and Taiwan pushed their firms onto world markets by 
subsidizing them heavily, and delayed import liberalization until domestic firms could stand on 
their feet.  Strategies of this sort have the advantage, from the current perspective, of ensuring 
that labor remains employed in firms that might otherwise get decimated by import competition.  
Such firms may not be the most efficient in the economy, but they often provide jobs at 
productivity levels that exceed their employees’ next-best alternative (i.e., informality or 
agriculture).    
  A related issue concerns the real exchange rate.  Countries in Latin America and Africa 
have typically liberalized in the context of overvalued currencies – driven either by 
disinflationary monetary policies or by large foreign aid inflows.  Overvaluation squeezes 
tradable industries further, damaging especially the more modern ones in manufacturing that 
operate at tight profit margins.  Asian countries, by contrast, have often targeted competitive real 
exchange rates with the express purpose of promoting their tradable industries.  Below, we will 
provide some empirical evidence on the role played by the real exchange rate in promoting 
desirable structural change.                 24
  Globalization promotes specialization according to comparative advantage.  Here there is 
another potentially important difference among countries.  Some countries – many in Latin 
America and Africa – are well-endowed with natural resources and primary products.  In these 
economies, opening up to the world economy reduces incentives to diversify towards modern 
manufactures and reinforces traditional specialization patterns.  As we have seen, some primary 
sectors such as minerals do operate at very high levels of labor productivity.  The problem with 
such activities, however, is that they have a very limited capacity to generate substantial 
employment. So in economies with a comparative advantage in natural resources, we expect the 
positive contribution of structural change associated with participation in international markets  
to be limited.  Asian countries, most of which are well endowed with labor but not natural 
resources, have a natural advantage here.  The regression results to be presented below bear this 
intuition out.  
  The rate at which structural change in the direction of modern activities takes place can 
also be influenced by ease of entry and exit into industry and by the flexibility of labor markets.  
Ciccone and Papaioannou (2008) show that intersectoral reallocation within manufacturing 
industries is slowed down by entry barriers.  When employment conditions are perceived as 
“rigid,” say because of firing costs that are too high, firms are likely to respond to new 
opportunities by upgrading plant and equipment (capital deepening) rather than by hiring new 
workers.  This slows down the transition of workers to modern economic activities.  This 
hypothesis also receives some support from the data.   
  We now present the results of some exploratory regressions aimed at uncovering the 
main determinants of differences across countries in the contribution of structural change (Table 
5).  We regress the structural-change term over the 1990-2005 period (the second term in   25
equation (1), annualized in percentage terms) on a number of plausible independent variables.  
We view these regressions as a first pass through the data, rather than a full-blown causal 
analysis.        
  We begin by examining the role of initial structural gaps.  Clearly, the wider those gaps, 
the larger the room for growth-enhancing structural change for standard dual-economy model 
reasons.  We proxy these gaps by agriculture’s employment share at the beginning of the period 
(1990).  Somewhat surprisingly, even though this variable enters the regression with a positive 
coefficient, it falls far short of statistical significance (column 1).  The implication is that 
domestic convergence, just like convergence with rich countries, is not an unconditional process.  
Starting out with a significant share of your labor force in agriculture may increase the potential 
for structural-change induced growth, but the mechanism is clearly not automatic.      
Note that we have included regional dummies (in this and all other specifications), with 
Asia as the excluded category.  The statistically significant coefficients on Latin America and 
Africa (both negative) indicate that the regional differences we have discussed previously are 
also meaningful in a statistical sense.     
We next introduce the share of a country’s exports that is accounted for by raw materials, 
as an indicator of comparative advantage.  This indicator enters with a negative coefficient, and 
is highly significant (column 2).  There is a very strong and negative association between a 
country’s reliance on primary products and the rate at which structural change contributes to 
growth.  Countries that specialize in primary products are at a distinct disadvantage. 
We note two additional points about column (2).  First, agriculture’s share in employment 
now turns statistically significant.  This indicates the presence of conditional convergence: 
conditional on not having a strong comparative advantage in primary products, starting out with   26
a large countryside of surplus workers does help.  Second, once the comparative advantage 
indicator is entered, the coefficients on regional dummies are slashed and they are no longer 
statistically significant.  In other words, comparative advantage and the initial agricultural share 
can jointly fully explain the large differences in average performance across regions.  Countries 
that do well are those that start out with a lot of workers in agriculture but do not have a strong 
comparative advantage in primary products.  That most Asian countries fit this characterization 
explains the Asian difference we have highlighted above.     
For trade/currency practices, we use a measure of the undervaluation of a country’s 
currency, based on a comparison of price levels across countries (after adjusting for the Balassa-
Samuelson effect; see Rodrik 2008).  For labor markets, we use the employment rigidity index 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators data base.  The results in columns (3)-(5) 
indicate that both of these indicators enter the regression with the expected sign and are 
statistically significant. Undervaluation promotes growth-enhancing structural change, while 
employment rigidity inhibits it.  
We have tried a range of other specifications and additional regressors, including income 
levels, demographic indicators, institutional quality, and tariff levels.  But none of these variables 
have turned out to be consistently significant.     
  
V.  Concluding comments 
Large gaps in labor productivity between the traditional and modern parts of the economy 
are a fundamental reality of developing societies.  In this paper, we have documented these gaps, 
and emphasized that labor flows from low-productivity activities to high-productivity activities 
are a key driver of development.     27
Our results show that since 1990 structural change has been growth reducing in both 
Africa and Latin America, with the most striking changes taking place in Latin America. The 
bulk of the difference between these countries’ productivity performance and that of Asia is 
accounted for by differences in the pattern of structural change – with labor moving from low- to 
high-productivity sectors in Asia, but in the opposite direction in Latin America and Africa.  
A key promise of globalization was that access to global markets and increased 
competition would drive an economy’s resources toward more productive uses and enhance 
allocative efficiency.  It is certainly true that firms that are exposed to foreign competition have 
had no choice but to either become more productive or shut down.  As trade barriers have come 
down, industries have rationalized, upgraded and become more efficient.  But an economy’s 
overall productivity depends not only on what’s happening within industries, but also on the 
reallocation of resources across sectors.  This is where globalization has produced a highly 
uneven result. Our empirical work shows that countries with a comparative advantage in natural 
resources run the risk of stunting their process of structural transformation.  The risks are 
aggravated by policies that allow the currency to become overvalued and place large costs on 
firms when they hire or fire workers.      
Structural change, like economic growth itself, is not an automatic process. It needs a 
nudge in the appropriate direction, especially when a country has a strong comparative advantage 
in natural resources.  Globalization does not alter this underlying reality.  But it does increase the 
costs of getting the policies wrong, just as it increases the benefits of getting them right.
9    
                                                 
9 This is not the place to get into an extended discussion on policies that promote economic diversification.  See 
Cimoli et al. (2009) and Rodrik (2007, chap. 4).   28
Appendix: Data description    
Our analysis is based on a panel of 38 countries with data on employment, value added 
(in 2000 PPP U.S. dollars), and labor productivity (also in 2000 PPP U.S. dollars) disaggregated 
into 9 economic sectors (see Table A.1), starting in 1990 and ending in 2005. Our main source of 
data is the 10-Sector Productivity Database, by Timmer and de Vries (2009). These data are  
available at http://www.ggdc.net/databases/10_sector.htm.  The latest update available for each 
country was used. Data for Latin American and Asian countries came from the June 2007 
update, while data for the European countries and the U.S. came from the October 2008 update. 
 We supplemented the 10-Sector Database with data for Turkey, China, and nine African 
countries: Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and 
Zambia. In compiling this extended dataset, we followed Timmer and de Vries (2009) as closely 
as possible so that the resulting value added, employment and labor productivity data would be  
comparable to that of the 10-Sector Database. Our data includes information on value added, 
aggregated into 9 main sectors according to the definitions in the 2
nd revision of the international 
standard industrial classification (ISIC, rev. 2), from national accounts data from a variety of 
national and international sources. Similarly, we used data from several population censuses as 
well as labor and household surveys to get estimates of sectoral employment. Following Timmer 
and de Vries (2009), we define sectoral employment as all persons employed in a particular 
sector, regardless of their formality status or whether they were self-employed or family-
workers. Also following Timmer and de Vries, we use population census data to measure levels 
of employment by sector and complement this data with labor force surveys (LFS) or 




Supplementing the 10-Sector Database 
 
Data on value added by sector for Turkey comes from national accounts data from the 
Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat). The latest available benchmark year is 1998 and TurkStat 
publishes sectoral value added figures (in current and constant 1998 prices) with this benchmark 
year starting in 1998 and going all the way up to 2009. These series were linked with series on 
sectoral value added (in current and constant prices) with a different benchmark year (i.e. 1987) 
which yielded sectoral value added series going from 1968 to 2009.
10 This was done for sectoral 
value added in current and constant prices. Data on employment by sector comes from sectoral 
employment estimates published by Turkstat. These estimates come from annual household LFS 
that are updated with data from the most recent population census. These surveys cover all 
persons employed regardless of their rural or urban status, formality status, and cover self-
employed and family workers. Hence, they seem to be a good and reliable source of total 
employment by sector.  
  Chinese data were compiled from several China Statistical Yearbooks, published by the 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The Statistical Yearbooks include data on value added (in 
current and constant prices) disaggregated into three main “industries”: primary, secondary and 
tertiary. The NBS further decomposes the secondary industry series into construction and 
                                                 
10 We linked these series with the ones having 1998 as a benchmark year using yearly sectoral value added growth 
rates for the 1968-1998 period published by Turkstat.   29
“industry” (i.e. all other non-construction activities in the secondary sector). The tertiary industry 
series includes data on services.  In order to get disaggregated value added series for the other 7 
sectors of interest (i.e. sectors other than agriculture and construction) we had to disaggregate 
value added data for the secondary and tertiary sectors. We did this by calculating sectoral 
distributions of value added for the non-construction secondary industry and tertiary industry 
from different tables published by the NBS. We then used these distributions and the yearly 
value added series for the non-construction secondary industry and the tertiary industry to get 
estimates of sectoral value added for the other 7 sectors of interest. These estimates, along with 
the value added series for the primary industry (i.e. agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing) and 
the construction sector, yielded series of value added by sector disaggregated into our 9 sectors 
of interest. 
  Sectoral employment was calculated using data from the NBS. The NBS publishes 
reliable sectoral employment estimates based on data from a number of labor force surveys and 
calibrated using data from the different population censuses. Given the availability and reliability 
of these estimates and that they are based on and calibrated using data from the different rounds 
of population censuses, we decided to use these employment series to get our sectoral 
employment estimates. In some cases, we aggregated the NBS’ employment series to get sectoral 
employment at the level we wanted.
11  
Our African sample includes Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, 
Senegal, South Africa, and Zambia and covers almost half of total sub-Saharan population (47%) 
and close to two thirds of total sub-Saharan GDP (63%).
12 The particular steps to get estimates of 
sectoral value added and employment for these sub-Saharan countries varied due to differences 
in data availability. Once again, we followed Timmer and de Vries’ (2007, 2009) methodology 
as closely as possible to ensure comparability with data from the 10-Sector Database. We used 
data on sectoral employment from population censuses and complemented this with data from 
labor force surveys and household surveys. We took care to make sure that employment in the 
informal sector was accounted for. In some cases, this meant using data from surveys of the 
informal sector (when available) to refine our estimates of sectoral employment. We used data 
on value added by sector from national accounts data from different national sources and 
complemented them with data from the UN’s national accounts statistics in cases where national 
sources were incomplete or we found inconsistencies. Due to the relative scarcity of data sources 
for many of the sub-Saharan economies in our sample, our data are probably not appropriate to 
study short-term (i.e. yearly) fluctuations, but we think they are still indicative of medium-term 
trends in sectoral labor productivity.  
  
                                                 
11 Due to data availability we were only able to calculate estimates of sectoral employment for our 9 sectors of 
interest from 1990 to 2001. We compared our sectoral employment estimates with those published by the Asian 
Productivity Organization (APO) in its APO Productivity Database. Our sectoral employment estimates are identical 
to the ones calculated by the APO for all but the 3 sectors: utilities, wholesale and retail trade, and the community, 
social, personal and government services sectors. Overall, these discrepancies were small. Moreover, while our 
sectoral employment estimates only cover the 1990-2001 period, the APO employment estimates go from 1978 to 
2007. Given the close match between our estimates and those from the APO, and the longer time period covered by 
the APO data, we decided to use APO’s sectoral employment estimates in order to maintain intertemporal 
consistency in the sectoral employment data for China. 
12 Total GDP (in constant 2000 $US) and total population in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2009 (WDI, 2010).   30
 
Table A.1:  Sector coverage                
                 
Sector  Abbreviation     ISIC rev. 2     ISIC rev. 3 Equivalent 
                 
                 
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing  agr     Major division 1     A+B 
                 
Mining and Quarrying  min     Major division 2     C 
                 
Manufacturing  man     Major division 3     D 
                 
Public Utilities (Electricity, Gas, and Water)  pu     Major division 4     E 
                 
Construction  con      Major division 5     F 
                 
Wholesale and Retail Trade, Hotels and 
Restaurants 
wrt     Major division 6     G+H 
                 
Transport, Storage and Communications  tsc     Major divison 7     I 
                 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Business 
Services  fire     Major division 8     J+K 
                 
Community, Social, Personal and 
Government Services 
cspsgs     Major division 9     O+P+Q+L+M+N 
                 
Economy-wide  sum             
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1 United States USA 70,235 0.062 pu 391,875 con 39,081 1.80%
2 France FRA 56,563 0.047 pu 190,785 cspsgs 37,148 1.20%
3 Netherlands NLD 51,516 0.094 min 930,958 cspsgs 33,190 1.04%
4 Italy ITA 51,457 0.058 pu 212,286 cspsgs 36,359 0.73%
5 Sweden SWE 50,678 0.051 pu 171,437 cspsgs 24,873 2.79%
6 Japan JPN 48,954 0.064 pu 173,304 agr 13,758 1.41%
7 United Kingdom UKM 47,349 0.076 min 287,454 wrt 30,268 1.96%
8 Spain ESP 46,525 0.062 pu 288,160 con 33,872 0.64%
9 Denmark DNK 45,423 0.088 min 622,759 cspsgs 31,512 1.53%
Asia
10 Hong Kong HKG 66,020 0.087 pu 407,628 agr 14,861 3.27%
11 Singapore SGP 62,967 0.068 pu 192,755 agr 18,324 3.71%
12 Taiwan TWN 46,129 0.094 pu 283,639 agr 12,440 3.99%
13 South Korea KOR 33,552 0.106 pu 345,055 fire 9,301 3.90%
14 Malaysia MYS 32,712 0.113 min 469,892 con 9,581 4.08%
15 Thailand THA 13,842 0.127 pu 161,943 agr 3,754 3.05%
16 Indonesia IDN 11,222 0.106 min 85,836 agr 4,307 2.78%
17 Philippines PHL 10,146 0.097 pu 90,225 agr 5,498 0.95%
18 China CHN 9,518 0.122 fire 105,832 agr 2,594 8.78%
19 India IND 7,700 0.087 pu 47,572 agr 2,510 4.23%
Middle East
20 Turkey TUR 25,957 0.080 pu 148,179 agr 11,629 3.16%
Latin America
21 Argentina ARG 30,340 0.083 min 239,645 fire 18,290 2.35%
22 Chile CHL 29,435 0.084 min 194,745 wrt 17,357 2.93%
23 Mexico MEX 23,594 0.078 pu 88,706 agr 9,002 1.07%
24 Venezuela VEN 20,799 0.126 min 297,975 pu 7,392 ‐0.35%
25 Costa Rica CRI 20,765 0.056 tsc 55,744 min 10,575 1.25%
26 Colombia COL 14,488 0.108 pu 271,582 wrt 7,000 0.18%
27 Peru PER 13,568 0.101 pu 117,391 agr 4,052 3.41%
28 Brazil BRA 12,473 0.111 pu 111,923 wrt 4,098 0.44%
29 Bolivia BOL 6,670 0.137 min 121,265 con 2,165 0.88%
Africa
30 South Africa ZAF 35,760 0.074 pu 91,210 con 10,558 0.63%
31 Mauritius MUS 35,381 0.058 pu 137,203 agr 24,795 3.44%
32 Nigeria NGA 4,926 0.224 min 866,646 cspsgs 264 2.28%
33 Senegal SEN 4,402 0.178 fire 297,533 agr 1,271 0.47%
34 Kenya KEN 3,707 0.158 pu 73,937 wrt 1,601 ‐1.22%
35 Ghana GHA 3,280 0.132 pu 47,302 wrt 1,507 1.05%
36 Zambia ZMB 2,643 0.142 fire 47,727 agr 575 ‐0.32%
37 Ethiopia ETH 2,287 0.154 fire 76,016 agr 1,329 1.87%











Country Labor Productivity* Country Labor Productivity*
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing agr 17,530 USA 65,306 MWI 521
Mining and Quarrying min 154,648 NLD 930,958 ETH 3,652
Manufacturing man 38,503 USA 114,566 ETH 2,401
Public Utilities (Electricity, Gas, and Water) pu 146,218 HKG 407,628 MWI 6,345
Construction con  24,462 VEN 154,672 MWI 2,124
Wholesale and Retail Trade, Hotels and Restaurants wrt 22,635 HKG 60,868 GHA 1,507
Transport, Storage and Communications tsc 46,421 USA 101,302 GHA 6,671
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services fire 62,184 SEN 297,533 KOR 9,301
Community, Social, Personal and Government 
Services
cspsgs 20,534 TWN 53,355 NGA 264









LAC 1.35% 2.24% ‐0.88%
AFRICA 0.86% 2.13% ‐1.27%
ASIA 3.87% 3.31% 0.57%
HI 1.46% 1.54% ‐0.09%
component due to:Table 4:  Country rankings 
rank country region "within" rank country region
"structural 
change"
1 CHN ASIA 7.79% 1 THA ASIA 1.67%
2 ZMB AFRICA 7.61% 2 ETH AFRICA 1.48%
3 KOR ASIA 5.29% 3 TUR TURKEY 1.42%
4 NGA AFRICA 4.08% 4 HKG ASIA 1.25%
5 PER LAC 3.85% 5 IDN ASIA 1.06%
6 CHL LAC 3.82% 6 CHN ASIA 0.99%
7 SGP ASIA 3.79% 7 IND ASIA 0.99%
8 SEN AFRICA 3.61% 8 GHA AFRICA 0.59%
9 MYS ASIA 3.59% 9 TWN ASIA 0.54%
10 TWN ASIA 3.45% 10 MYS ASIA 0.49%
11 BOL LAC 3.37% 11 MUS AFRICA 0.38%
12 IND ASIA 3.24% 12 CRI LAC 0.38%
13 VEN LAC 3.20% 13 MEX LAC 0.23%
14 MUS AFRICA 3.06% 14 KEN AFRICA 0.23%
15 ARG LAC 2.94% 15 ITA HI 0.17%
16 SWE HI 2.83% 16 PHL ASIA 0.14%
17 UKM HI 2.47% 17 ESP HI 0.13%
18 USA HI 2.09% 18 DNK HI 0.02%
19 HKG ASIA 2.02% 19 FRA HI 0.00%
20 TUR TURKEY 1.74% 20 JPN HI ‐0.01%
ranked by the contribution of "within" ranked by the contribution of "str. change"Table 5: Determinants of the magnitude of the structural‐change term
Dependent variable: structural‐change term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
agricultural share in employment 0.013 0.027 0.016 0.023
(0.98) (2.26)** (1.48) (2.45)**
raw materials share in exports ‐0.050 ‐0.045 ‐0.046 ‐0.038
(2.44)** (2.41)** (2.73)** (2.29)**




Latin America dummy ‐0.014 0.007 0.006 0.013 0.007
(2.65)** (0.74) (0.72) (1.49) (0.85)
Africa dummy ‐0.022 ‐0.006 ‐0.005 ‐0.004 ‐0.003
(2.04)** (0.80) (0.83) (0.75) (0.38)
High income dummy ‐0.003 ‐0.001 0.008 0.013 0.010
(0.66) (0.14) (0.98) (1.47) (1.06)
constant 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.009 0.014
(0.30) (1.11) (1.37) (2.03) (3.63)*
Observations 38 38 38 37 37
















































































Figure 1: Labor productivity gaps in Turkey  
 
Note:  Unless otherwise noted, the source for all the data is the dataset described in the main 
body of the paper. Abbreviations are as follows: (agr) Agriculture; (min) Mining; (mfg) 
Manufacturing; (pu) Public Utilities; (con) Construction; (wrt) Retail and Wholesale Trade; (tsc) 
Transport and Communication; (fire) Finance and Business Services; (cspsgs) Community, 
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Figure 2: Relationship between inter-sectoral productivity gaps and income levels. 
 
The coefficient of variation in sectoral labor productivities within countries (vertical axis) is 
graphed against the log of the countries’ average labor productivity (horizontal axis), both in 
2005  
 
Figure 3: Counterfactual impact of changed economic structure on economy-wide labor 
productivity, non-African countries 
 
These figures are the percent increase in economy-wide average labor productivity obtained 
under the assumption that the inter-sectoral composition of the labor force matches the pattern 
observed in the rich countries. 
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Figure 4: Counterfactual impact of changed economic structure on economy-wide labor 
productivity, African countries 
 
These figures are the percent increase in economy-wide average labor productivity obtained 
under the assumption that the inter-sectoral composition of the labor force matches the pattern 
observed in the rich countries. 
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Figure 5:  Relationship between economy-wide labor productivity (horizontal axis) and the ratio 
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Figure 6: Relationship between economy-wide labor productivity (horizontal axis) and the ratio 
of agricultural productivity to non-agricultural productivity (percent, vertical axis), selected 
countries 
 
   
 
Figure 7: Productivity decomposition for Latin America, 1950-2005   
 
Source: Pages et al., 2010. 
Productivity decomposition in Latin America across different periods
(annual growth rates)
















Figure 8: Decomposition of productivity growth by country group, 1990-2005  










Figure 9: Decomposition of productivity growth by country group, 1990-2005 
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Change in Employment Share
(Emp. Share)
Fitted values
*Note: Size of circle represents employment share in 1990
**Note:  denotes coeff. of independent variable in regression equation:
            ln(p/P) =   + Emp. Share
Source: Authors' calculations with data from Timmer and de Vries (2009)
 =  -7.0981; t-stat = -1.21
Correlation Between Sectoral Productivity and




Note:  Abbreviations are as follows: (agr) Agriculture; (min) Mining; (mfg) Manufacturing; (pu) 
Public Utilities; (con) Construction; (wrt) Retail and Wholesale Trade; (tsc) Transport and 
Communication; (fire) Finance and Business Services; (cspsgs) Community, Social, Personal 
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Change in Employment Share
(Emp. Share)
Fitted values
*Note: Size of circle represents employment share in 1990
**Note:  denotes coeff. of independent variable in regression equation:
            ln(p/P) =   + Emp. Share
Source: Authors' calculations with data from Timmer and de Vries (2009)
 =  -2.2102; t-stat = -0.17
Correlation Between Sectoral Productivity and





Note:  Abbreviations are as follows: (agr) Agriculture; (min) Mining; (mfg) Manufacturing; (pu) 
Public Utilities; (con) Construction; (wrt) Retail and Wholesale Trade; (tsc) Transport and 
Communication; (fire) Finance and Business Services; (cspsgs) Community, Social, Personal 
and Government Services.  
Figure 12 
 
Note:  Abbreviations are as follows: (agr) Agriculture; (min) Mining; (mfg) Manufacturing; (pu) 
Public Utilities; (con) Construction; (wrt) Retail and Wholesale Trade; (tsc) Transport and 
Communication; (fire) Finance and Business Services; (cspsgs) Community, Social, Personal 
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Change in Employment Share
(Emp. Share)
Fitted values
*Note: Size of circle represents employment share in 1990
**Note:  denotes coeff. of independent variable in regression equation:
            ln(p/P) =   + Emp. Share
Source: Authors' calculations with data from Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics and ILO's LABORSTA
 = -12.2100; t-stat = -1.06
Correlation Between Sectoral Productivity and
Change in Employment Shares in Nigeria (1990-2005) 
Figure 13 
 
Note:  Abbreviations are as follows: (agr) Agriculture; (min) Mining; (mfg) Manufacturing; (pu) 
Public Utilities; (con) Construction; (wrt) Retail and Wholesale Trade; (tsc) Transport and 
Communication; (fire) Finance and Business Services; (cspsgs) Community, Social, Personal 
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Change in Employment Share
(Emp. Share)
Fitted values
*Note: Size of circle represents employment share in 1990
**Note:  denotes coeff. of independent variable in regression equation:
            ln(p/P) =   + Emp. Share
Source: Authors' calculations with data from CSO, Bank of Zambia, and ILO's KILM
 = -10.9531; t-stat = -3.25
Correlation Between Sectoral Productivity and
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(Emp. Share)
Fitted values
*Note: Size of circle represents employment share in 1990
**Note:  denotes coeff. of independent variable in regression equation:
            ln(p/P) =   + Emp. Share
Source: Authors' calculations with data from Timmer and de Vries (2009)
 =  35.2372; t-stat = 2.97
Correlation Between Sectoral Productivity and




Note:  Abbreviations are as follows: (agr) Agriculture; (min) Mining; (mfg) Manufacturing; (pu) 
Public Utilities; (con) Construction; (wrt) Retail and Wholesale Trade; (tsc) Transport and 
Communication; (fire) Finance and Business Services; (cspsgs) Community, Social, Personal 
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Fitted values
*Note: Size of circle represents employment share in 1990
**Note:  denotes coeff. of independent variable in regression equation:
            ln(p/P) =   + Emp. Share
Source: Authors' calculations with data from Timmer and de Vries (2009)
 =   5.1686; t-stat = 1.27
Correlation Between Sectoral Productivity and




Note:  Abbreviations are as follows: (agr) Agriculture; (min) Mining; (mfg) Manufacturing; (pu) 
Public Utilities; (con) Construction; (wrt) Retail and Wholesale Trade; (tsc) Transport and 
Communication; (fire) Finance and Business Services; (cspsgs) Community, Social, Personal 
and Government Services. 
 